Adopting a broader behavioral additionality framework for evaluating public R&D support programs, this study investigates explicitly the moderating effect of firm's internal climate for innovation on the relationship between public R&D support and firm innovation behavior. We hypothesize that if there is a positive relationship between public R&D support and firm innovation activities, this phenomenon is more likely to be observed in firms with a promotive internal climate for innovation, rather than in firms with a restrictive one. Based on a sample of 135 Singapore manufacturing firms, we discover significant moderating effect of firm's internal climate for innovation on the impact of public R&D support on several measures of firm innovation input, output and collaboration behavior. We identify two distinct dimensions of internal climate for innovation (organizational policies and individual attitudes) which exhibit different moderating effect. Moreover, if this moderating effect is not taken into account, the impact of public R&D support on some aspects of firm innovation behavior may be obscured.
The Moderating Effect of Firm's Internal Climate for Innovation
On the Impact of Public R&D Support Programs
Introduction
Economists have long recognized the importance of technological innovation in productivity improvement at the firm level and spillover benefits at the level of industry and society (Schumpeter, 1947; Bozeman and Link, 1983; Nelson and Romer, 1996; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1998) .
Governments have a wide range of S&T policy tools to influence either the supply side, the demand side, or the general economic, political and legal environment of the innovation process (Rothwell and Zegveld, 1981; Kim and Dahlman, 1999; Wong, 1999) . In particular, the provision of public support for private R&D has been an important instrument of government S&T policy. A key empirical issue is therefore the likely effectiveness of such direct public R&D support programs on the innovation behavior of the recipient firms.
The vast theoretical literature on market failure associated with R&D and technological innovation (e.g. limited appropriability (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962) , financial market failure (Martin and Scott, 1999) , standardization and coordination failure (Aoki et al., 1997) ) has led to the recognition that reliance on market processes alone will result in under-investment in R&D by profit-seeking firms 1 , from a social point of view. The likelihood of under-investment in R&D justifies the desirability of public support for private R&D activities to correct for the market failure in the production and/or application of scientific and technological knowledge. Indeed, all OECD countries, followed by the Asian NIEs, have spent significant amounts of public money on programs intended to stimulate innovation.
There is also a considerable body of literature on why firms tend to under-invest in collaborative R&D with other parties. Despite a variety of potential benefits of R&D collaboration, such as economies of scale/scope in research, costs/risks sharing, synergy among different skills/resources, internalization of spillovers, etc., firms may still invest socially sub-optimal amounts in collaborative 1 Fudenberg and Tirole (1987) suggest at least the possibility of overinvestment in innovation by competing rivals to seek post-innovation competitive advantage.
R&D (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; Tripsas et al., 1995) . Imperfect appropriability, risk aversion and fear of opportunistic behavior are noted reasons for under-investment in collaborative R&D (Tripsas, et al., 1995; Combs, 1990) .
In spite of the extensive adoption of public support programs to stimulate private R&D activities, the evidence on the effect of such government intervention on stimulating innovation and productivity gains in the recipient firms has been mixed. David et al. (2000) surveyed the body of econometric evidence accumulated over the years since Blank and Stigler (1957) first attempted to test for a complementary or substitutive relationship between public support and private R&D. Among 33 studies included in their review, one third of the cases reported that public R&D funding behaves as a substitute for private R&D investment, 16 cases concluded a complementary relationship, and the rest 6 cases showed either insignificant or mixed results.
The evaluation of public-sponsored collaborative R&D program is far from conclusive likewise. Sakakibara's (1997) analysis showed that participants did not perceive public-sponsored R&D consortia to be critical to the establishment of their competitive position. In Taiwan, the feasibility and effectiveness of public-sponsored R&D consortium projects were put under doubt because several such undertakings had not performed as well as expected (Wang, 1994) . However, Tripsas et al. (1995) found Italian firms participating in a Societa di Ricerca (a public-sponsored research consortium) valued government assistance in establishing long-term relationships and facilitating networking as much as they valued government funding.
The above inconsistence in the empirical evidence indicates the need for further micro-level studies on how public R&D support programs influence firm innovation behavior. As pointed out by Bozeman and Link (1983) , much of the literature on the impact of public policy on the innovation behavior of firms suffers from the limitation that the firm is treated as a unitary actor with overly simplified rationality assumptions. This simplification largely ignores much of the recent developments in organizational behavior research. Bozeman and Link (1983) suggested that, by taking into account internal organizational variables such as decentralization, administrative intensity, bureaucratic control, and hierarchy, we may deepen and broaden our understanding of the impact of public R&D support on firms' innovation behavior.
The present study is intended to contribute to the literature by investigating explicitly the moderating effect of firm's internal climate for innovation on the effectiveness of public R&D support. We hypothesize that if there is a positive relationship between public R&D support and firm innovation activities, this phenomenon is more likely to be observed in firms with a "promotive" internal climate for innovation, rather than in firms with a "restrictive" one. Based on a sample of 135
Singapore manufacturing firms, we show that the impact of public R&D support on firm innovation behavior and performance is significantly moderated by firm's internal climate for innovation.
Interestingly, we find that if this moderating effect is not taken into account, the impact of public R&D support on some aspects of firm innovation behavior may be obscured. Moreover, we identify two distinct dimensions of internal climate for innovation (organizational policies and individual attitudes) which exhibit different moderating effect. 1987 -1996 (Irwin and Klenow, 1996 . The budget of EUREKA projects varied between less than 1 million ECU and more than 40 million ECU (van Rossum and Cabo, 1995) . The most celebrated program in Japan, VLSI, was conducted between 1975-1985 with a budget of ¥130 billion (US$591 million) of which 22% was financed by the government (Sakakibara, 1997) .
Literature review

Public R&D support program
In terms of policy design and execution, public support for firm R&D and R&D collaboration are often intertwined. Governments typically encourage firms to work with their suppliers, customers, competitors, universities and research institutes by allocating a pool of funds for collaborative projects. Besides providing funding, another important government role in promoting collaborative R&D is to discourage opportunistic behavior by "institutional" mechanisms and "administrative" mechanisms (Tripsas et al., 1995) . For the government, the rationale for promoting R&D collaboration is dual: to correct for the market failure that results in under-investment in R&D by profit-seeking firms and to improve the "efficiency" of public support for private R&D. First, collaborative R&D may restore the incentive for firm R&D investment when there is market failure due to limited appropriability or excessive technical risk. Second, collaborative R&D help improve the efficiency of public R&D support by eliminating overlapping investments 2 , reducing the time horizons for R&D and stimulating additional spillovers from public research (OECD, 1999) .
Input additionality and output additionality analysis for public R&D support program
Analysis of the possible impact of public R&D support programs can be divided into two aspects:
input additionality analysis and output additionality analysis. The term "additionality" refers to the changes in firm behavior and performance that would not have occurred without the public support program. Input additionality analysis examines whether public R&D support is complementary and thus "additional" to private R&D spending, rather than substitutive for and "crowding out" private R&D (see David et al., 2000 , for a comprehensive review), while output additionality analysis assesses the incremental increase in innovation output or performance that can be attributed to the presence of the public R&D support program.
One study approach adopted by some researchers to assess input additionality is to ask managers in subsidized firms how they would have behaved if no financial incentive had been available 3 . Most interview studies seem to indicate that the complementary effect is very weak (Kauko, 1996) .
Martinez-Sanchez and Navarro Elda (1991) found public financial aid was considered the least important factor among 12 different suggested innovation stimuli by Spanish managers, but Sakakibara's (1997) survey concluded that there was a 38% increase in private R&D investment, on average, in areas related to public-sponsored R&D projects.
The typical econometric approach is to regress measures of private R&D on the government funding (dummy or magnitude), along with other control variables. Econometric studies for input 2 In some cases, focusing on one technological paradigm, especially in the early stage of a technology's development, may actually inhibit innovation (Nelson and Langlois, 1983) . Brodley (1990) also warns that cooperative research can reduce competition and delay research progress because of free-riding behavior. 3 However, one might argue that, in this hyperthetical case, respondents have an interest in the continuation of public support, and hence will over-emphasize the effects it has, or the management is reluctant to admit that an external input has influenced its behavior, and hence under-emphasize the effects of public R&D support (Sakakibara, 1997) additionality analysis have been criticized for producing biased results because of selection bias, endogeneity and common latent variable problems. Selection bias may arise because the R&D behavior of the non-supported firms may differ systematically from that of the supported firms even in the absence of the support schemes. Under this circumstance, constructing a valid control group is challenging because the counterfactural, "how much more R&D did firms do given the existence of financial aid than they would have done if there had been no financial aid", is never observed.
The issue of endogeneity arises when we cannot distinguish whether public support causes firms to do more R&D or whether firms doing more R&D receive more public support. The existence of omitted common latent variables which are correlated with both public support and private R&D behavior can also invalidate research findings. For instance, the effects of unobserved inter-industry differences in the technological opportunity are likely to induce positive covariation in public funding and private R&D investment. While sophisticated econometric techniques have been used to address these estimation problems, and many studies have been able to support the complementarity argument, there is no shortage of investigations that arrive at the contrary conclusion (David et al., 2000) .
Output additionality analysis assumes the existence of a formal relationship between R&D expenditure and productivity, and many studies conclude that the relationship between public R&D funding and various measures of economic growth and productivity is positive and substantial (see Klette et al., 2000 , for a comprehensive review). However, in output analysis, we have to face the paradoxical situation that if we find little difference between the supported group and the nonsupported group, it could be either because the public support program was unsuccessful and generated little innovation, or because the public support program was highly successful in generating new innovations which created large positive spillovers to the non-supported firms (Klette et al., 2000) . Spillovers are difficult to identify and account for, and the nature of the relationship between R&D input and productivity output is one of the least predicable in the economics of science and technology. To realize economic effects of research, a range of complementary factors within and beyond the innovation process should be accounted for, confounding the relationship under study (Georghiou and Roessner, 2000) .
Behavioral additionality-an extended evaluation framework for public R&D support program
Besides input and output additionality, indicators of indirect impacts of public R&D support programs have been increasingly adopted, especially by firm-level research. For instance, the "BETA method" originating from the laboratory at Strasbourg University offers a formula for calculating indirect benefits, such as spillovers from the project to other activities of the participant, reputation enhancement via the project, organizational or management improvements, and knowledge accumulation in the organization. Consistent with this paradigm, the CSI (Center for Sociology of Innovation, France) approach has focused their evaluation upon how networks are assembled to realize innovations in collective goods, moving away from pure economic appraisal (Georghiou and Roessner, 2000) .
Searching for a more comprehensive evaluation of public R&D support programs, Buisseret et al.
(1995) advocated a broader concept of additionality that takes into account the changes in the full breadth of innovation activities and corporate business/technology strategy, not just the R&D input and performance outcome.
Companies and institutions undertaking public-sponsored projects are rarely left unchanged by experience. … To describe such effects we introduce the concept of "behavioral additionality", the change in a company's way of undertaking R&D which can be attributed to policy actions… It can be seen that such profound changes in company competence and behavior which enable them to increase their commercial choices and effectiveness, are important result of policy initiatives. They must therefore be included in any assessment of addtionality, despite the difficulty in assigning individual measures to many aspects of such change (Buisseret et al., 1995, p.590) Previous firm-level studies also demonstrated that firms rarely attempt to estimate the precise dollar benefits gained from their participation in public R&D support programs. The perceived benefits of public R&D support programs are rather intangible, such as training of researchers, increased awareness of R&D opportunities in general, and establishment of informational networks (Sakakibara, 1997) . Respondents in the SEMATECH study by Link et al. (1996) also placed higher value on intangible benefits, such as benefits related to R&D management and integration, compared to tangible benefits flowing directly from research results. In many cases, the network created through public support program may give rise to partnership in other collaborative projects outside the government initiatives because the initial collaborative experience in public R&D support programs can build the foundations, recognitions and definitions for further collaboration (Vavakova, 1995) .
In sum, indirect and intangible benefits of public R&D support programs can potentially be very large. A broader behavioral additionality framework is therefore desirable to capture the bulk of non-monetized benefits associated with public R&D support programs.
The above literature review indicates that both the internal innovation behavior of individual firms as well as the external innovation collaboration and networking behavior among firms are likely to be positively influenced by public R&D support. While the above hypothesis postulates an overall relationship between public R&D support and the recipient firms' innovation behavior, we argue further that this relationship is likely to be significantly moderated by certain characteristics of the firms themselves, i.e. we need to look "inside the black box".
Hypotheses regarding the moderating effect of firm's climate for innovation
A wide range of candidate organizational variables theoretically could influence the impact of public R&D support programs on the innovation behavior of recipient firms (Bozeman and Link, 1983) .
However, there has been surprisingly few studies that provide empirical support for any of these possible candidate variables. In the absence of such empirical guidance, we propose in this study to adapt from the extant organizational behavior literature an analytical construct for the "internal climate for innovation", and hypothesize that it constitutes a significant factor that moderates the impact of public R&D support on the recipient firms' innovation behavior.
Our conceptualization of a firm's internal climate for innovation is derived from the broader concept of organizational climate (Glick, 1985; Schneider and Rentsch, 1988; Shepard, 1967) .
Organizational climate and organizational culture are closely related but distinct constructs. The most critical distinction is that culture operates at a greater level of abstraction than climate. While climate refers to organization members' shared perceptions of policies and procedures, culture represents the basic value and assumptions that underlie those policies and procedures (Tesluk et al., 1997) .
Organizations need to forge an internal climate to promote organizational readiness for innovation in the face of fierce competition and rapidly changing technological, economic, regulatory, and market conditions (Tesluk et al., 1997) . Souder (1987) has developed a comprehensive list of organizational characteristics which he classifies as either promotive or restrictive for innovation to occur within organizations. He argued that most of the successful innovation projects happen in promotive climates while a large number of failures occur in restrictive climates. Some commonly suggested aspects of promotive internal climate for innovation are willingness to tolerate unpredictability and failure, openness and trust, employee involvement practices that promote extensive participation, supportiveness and commitment to innovation on the level of management, and reward/recognition mechanisms that encourage risk-taking and experimenting (Abbey and Dickson, 1983; Kopelman et al., 1990; Shrivastava and Souder, 1987; Souder, 1987; Susanj, 2000) .
A promotive internal climate for innovation may moderate the impact of public R&D support programs in a number of ways. First, firms with a promotive innovation climate might be more responsive to public support stimuli. Using the analytical framework of David et al. (2000) , an individual firm can be modeled as having its own unique MCC (Marginal Cost of Capital for R&D) and/or MRR (Marginal Rate of Return for R&D) curves, and the same degree of public support may shift different firm's MCC and/or MRR curves differently, i.e., firms may exhibit heterogeneous response to public R&D support. It is quite plausible that firms with a promotive internal climate for innovation are more sensitive to public support, and more likely to acquire the benefits of public support and to change their R&D related behavior. For example, public R&D subsidies may signal future demand and thus increase firms' expected MRR schedule in general, but firms with a restrictive climate for innovation may ignore this signal or their internal organizational procedures may not allow them to respond quickly to this opportunity. Gold (1986) also argued that although the potential contributions of the government are important, and indeed necessary, they are limited to providing a helpful and supportive environment within which the direction and magnitude of achievement are determined by managerial vision, capabilities, and commitments. In Klettle et al.
(2000)'s discussion of fixed effect model, firm heterogeneous response to public R&D support has been accounted for, but it is not the focal variable and the source of heterogeneity is not specified.
Here, we propose explicitly that the heterogeneity in response elasticity may be related to this basic organizational variable--internal climate for innovation.
Second, many public R&D support programs are designed explicitly to encourage R&D collaboration among firms and/or between firms and public research institutes/universities. Besides the financial inducement, such programs create an opportunity for inter-organizational learning among the participating firms, which in turn would allow them to enhance their R&D capability, broaden their awareness of innovation opportunities, build social capital for future collaboration, and generally become better at capturing R&D spillover benefits from their collaborators. However, this
inter-organizational learning process may be limited in the absence of a promotive internal environment for innovation. Related to this, Leyden and Link (1991) has advanced the argument that infratechnology 4 is the critical link between governmental and private R&D, and that the observed complementarity is the result of technical complementarity in the production of private technological knowledge and infratechnology. Infratechnology accumulated through public R&D support programs can be exploited in private R&D, and the resulting increased R&D efficiency may enhance "absorptive capacity" and lower the firm's MCC schedule, and hence the participating firm is induced to do more private R&D on their own. However, firms that have a restrictive climate for innovation may not be able to acquire infratechnology effectively through public R&D support programs. As pointed out by Geroski(2000) , one can subsidize all kinds of things, but that may not be enough. In summary, we postulate that the effect of public R&D support on the innovation behavior of firms might be contingent upon the recipient firms' internal climate for innovation:
Hypothesis II: The relationship between public R&D support and firm innovation behavior will be significantly positive for firms with a promotive internal climate for innovation, but not for firms with a restrictive one.
Methods
Data source
The existing empirical literature on public support program is mostly based on observations drawn from OECD countries with a considerable greater weight in the body of US evidence. Although the gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) of Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore is approaching the level of the advanced industrial countries, and the NIEs governments have adopted an aggressive policy to provide strong public support for private R&D and networking among various innovation sectors (Wong, 1999) , there has been relatively little empirical literature on these rapidly growing economies.
Singapore's gross expenditure on R&D had increased nearly five-fold between 1990 and 1999, reaching S$2.66 billion in 1999, or 1.84% of GDP. This GERD/GDP ratio still falls behind Taiwan (1.98% in 1998), Korea (2.52% in 1998), and many developed countries, for example, Finland (3.11% in 1999), Japan (3.06% in 1998), USA (2.84% in 1999), and Germany (2.29% in 1998). The number of research scientists and engineers (RSEs) per 10,000 labor force reached 70 in 1999 from 28 in 1990. This figure is slightly above that of Taiwan (66 in 1998) and Korea (48 in 1997) , but it still lags behind countries like Japan (96 in 1998) and Finland (94 in 1998) . Both the public and private sector had contributed to this impressive growth in R&D intensities (See Table 1,Table 2, and University of Singapore (NUS). Questionnaires were sent out to R&D managers or production managers of 1876 companies, which were more than two thirds of all establishments within four major manufacturing clusters of Singapore: electronics, chemicals, precision and process engineering, and transport engineering (See appendix I for a detailed decomposition of clusters).
Missing data as well as doubtful or contradictory response have been clarified by telephone call-ups or in some cases removed from the sample. Five fields of information were solicited from the respondents: (1) general company details (2) innovation activities, (3) internal climate for innovation, (4) external collaboration in innovation, and (5) evaluation of innovation environment of Singapore. Following the OECD's Oslo Manual, firms are regarded as innovating if they have introduced to the market at least one of the following during the last three years: (1) a product new to the business or a substantially improved product (product innovation); (2) a new or substantially improved production process through new equipment or re-engineering (process innovation). The non-innovating respondents in the EDB/NUS-CMIT survey were not asked to offer information on innovation activities, internal climate for innovation and external collaboration in innovation.
Therefore, only 135 observations out of the 344 valid responses are usable for the present study, which shrinks the response rate to 7.2% from 18.3%. In sum, 27 electronics firms, 32 chemical firms, 61 precision and process engineering firms, and 15 transport engineering firms constitute our final dataset, with the corresponding response rates 12.9%, 10%, 5.9%, and 4.8%. Higher response rates for electronics cluster and chemical cluster result from higher proportion of innovating firms in these two sectors.
Measures
We construct for this study eight dependent variables to measure different dimensions of firm innovation behavior, and investigate the effect of a single explanatory variable -presence of public R&D support -on these dependent variables, after taking into account several widely accepted control variables, and two moderating variables measuring different aspects of the firms' internal climate for innovation.
Dependent Variables 1) R&D intensity:
R&D intensity is measured by total R&D expenditure as a percentage of total sales. Rather than detailed R&D spending data, mid-point estimate of 7 ordinal classes (0 = none, 1 = less than 2%, 2= 2%-4.9%, 3 = 5%-9.9%, 4 = 10%-19.9%, 5 = 20%-39.9%, and 6 = 40% and above) are used to measure firms' R&D intensity. There are only 3 firms fall into the 7 th class, and they are combined into the 6 th class because of their small number and indeterminacy. Although one shortcoming of this method is that we cannot quantify the extent to which public support can stimulate firm R&D spending, it is nevertheless conducive to solicit more responses because firms are usually reluctant to reveal their accurate R&D spending figures.
2) Innovation spending: Besides R&D, firms were also asked to indicate whether they were involved in other broad sense of innovation activities, such as acquisition of R&D services; acquisition of machinery, equipment and software linked to product and process innovation;
licensing of external technology linked to product and process innovation; industrial design, market research & marketing expense for product innovation; training directly linked to technological innovations. Innovation spending is measured by the total expenditure for the above activities (including R&D) as a percentage of total sales, which is a mid-point estimate of 6 ordinal classes (1 = less than 2%, 2 = 2%-4.9%, 3 = 5-9.9%, 4 =10%-19.9%, 5 = 20%-39.9%, and 6 = 40% and above). The 6 th class has only four cases. These four cases are combined into the 5 th class. R&D intensity and innovation spending constitute our two measures for innovation input.
3) & 4) Product innovation and process innovation:
In the survey, respondents were asked to indicate the approximate percentage of total annual sales that were derived from new/improved products introduced within the last three years, and the approximate percentage of production volume using new/improved processes introduced within the last three years. Mid-point estimate of ordinal classes (1= less than 10%, 2=10%-24%, 3=25%-49%, 4=50%-74%, and 5=75% and above)
is used. Product innovation and process innovation represent our measures for innovation output. Insert Table 4 about here We do not deliberately anticipate which type of innovation collaboration public support programs will encourage, but leave it as an empirical question. The role of multiple external linkages in the innovation process has been emphasized many times in the literature (Rothwell, 1992; von Hippel, 1988) , and previous studies have revealed that both types of collaboration are important and the government can play an important role in promoting both of them (Schoening et al., 1998; OECD, 1999; Tripsas, 1995) .
7) & 8) Innovation collaboration intensity along different stages of innovation process:
Besides partners involved in innovation collaboration, we also examine firms' innovation collaboration intensity along different stages of innovation process. In the questionnaire, firms were asked to provide information on how many partners they cooperate in each of the 6 stages of innovation process, namely, general information exchange, generation of new ideas, conception/front-end development, prototype development, pilot application, and market introduction. We aggregate the counts of collaboration at the first three stages of innovation process to represent pre-competitive collaboration intensity, and counts at the remaining 3 stages to represent near-market collaboration intensity. This method implicitly assumes that every count carries the same weight.
Much of the literature argues that public support for innovation partnership is most desirable at the pre-competitive stage of innovation process where market failure is most likely to occur. However, public support for R&D collaboration at the commercialization stage could also be justified if market failures (e.g. in financial markets) lead to under-investment in the use and application of technology for developing new products and processes (OECD, 1999) . Again, we leave this issue as an empirical question, for we are focusing on the moderating role of internal climate for innovation.
The above 4 innovation collaboration measures provide a tool to capture firms' networking behavior in the innovation process.
Explanatory Variable
Public R&D support: The respondents were asked to indicate whether or not they have participated in any public R&D support program over the last three years. A list of specific support programs launched by the Singapore government was provided to the respondents. Since we are looking at the overall impact of public R&D support, only a dummy variable is used to distinguish the supported firms from non-supported firms. While relatively imprecise, this measure has the merit that all respondents provided responses. From the sample of 135 firms, 58 firms are found to be in the supported group, while the other 77 firms report no support from the government.
Control variables
Firm size and industry dummies are often important determinants of firm R&D (See Cohen and Levin (1989) for a review of the relationship of R&D with firm size, market concentration, and technology characteristics), but their impacts have not been conclusive in the literature. A positive correlation between size and cooperative strategies has been found by Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1994) , but Kleinknecht and Van Reijnen (1992) found neither firm size nor market concentration significantly influences the probability of innovation collaboration. Industry dummies can capture various technology dimensions such as technological opportunity, appropriability regimes, cumulativeness, necessity for complementary and specialized assets, and hence often significantly improve explanatory power. Another consideration for accounting for industry dummies is the possible endogenous responses of both government and firm allocation decisions to technological opportunities across industries.
In the present study, logarithm of total assets, firm nationality dummy (foreign or local), electronics cluster dummy, chemical cluster dummy, precision and process engineering cluster dummy are included as control variables, with transport engineering as the baseline industry. The reason for including nationality dummy is that foreign firms (US, Japan, and Europe) in Singapore are usually larger, more integrated, more highly internationalized, and more engaged in innovation activity, compared to local firms. Public R&D support programs often have restrictions on the nationality of participating firms. For instance, foreign firms were not allowed to join Italian's Societa di Ricerca (Tripsas et al., 1995) , and SBIR awardees must have a majority of shares owned by US citizens (Klette et al. 2000) . However, Chi-square test (χ2=0.001) does not show any preference for foreign firms or local firms by the government in this study (Table 5 ). This is not surprising for Singapore because Singapore's rapid technological development has, until recent years, been largely dependent on foreign MNCs. Not only does Singapore government stimulate indigenous R&D, it also offers incentives for foreign MNCs to establish high value-added R&D activities in Singapore (Wong,
1999)
Insert Table 5 about here
Moderating Variables
Internal climate for innovation: Internal climate for innovation is measured by nine items each measured by a 5-point Likert scale (1= strongly agree to 5=strongly disagree). Factor analysis with principal component extraction and varimax rotation reveals two distinct factors which can be interpreted as representing organizational policies and individual attitudes respectively (Table 6 ).
The organizational policies factor has high loading on organizational compensation and evaluation system, innovation project management process, and organizational support for intrapreneurship.
The individual attitudes factor has high loading on measures of the employees and management's Discriminant validity is examined for this factor analysis. If the confidence intervals of the estimates of the inter-factor correlations do not include 1.0, discriminant validity is demonstrated (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988; Bagozzi and Phillips, 1982) . Although the two factors in our study are significant correlated, the confidence interval does not contain a value of 1.0 (p<.01). We also compare two-factor model with one factor model using CFA. A statistically significant chi-square difference provides evidence of discriminant validity (Bagozzi and Phillips, 1982) . In this study, the chi-square for one factor model is 72.500, and 52.560 for two-factor model, with a difference of 19.940 (p<.01). This result indicates the two-factor model clearly outperforms the one-factor model.
Insert Two methods for identifying moderator variables have been widely used in the literature: moderated regression analysis and subgroup regression analysis. Southwood (1978) and Schoonhoven (1981) argued a moderating effect is indicated by the statistical significance of a multiplicative interaction term irrespective of the statistical significance of its constituent parts. However, by Cohen and Cohen's (1975) definition, a moderator cannot be a significant explanatory variable nor can it be related to other independent variables. For subgroup regression analysis, some researchers emphasize the use of R square to determine the presence of a moderator variable whereas others test whether the form of relationship differs across subgroups. Following the process of Sharma, Durand, and Gur-Arie (1981) who have presented a typology of moderator variables with a framework for identifying their presence and type, we first conduct a full moderated regression analysis to identify interaction effects between internal climate for innovation and public R&D support on our eight dependent variables. We find no significant main effects and interaction effects of internal climate for innovation. In addition, there is no statistically significant correlation between the proposed moderating variables (internal climate for innovation) and the independent variable (public R&D support) as well as other control variables (See Table 7 ). Then, the next step is to conduct subgroup regression analysis to test the existence of the moderating effect. As Drazin and Van de Ven (1985) note, another reason for us to use subgroup regression analysis is the potential multicollinearity problem inherent in the moderated regression analysis. In the specific case of our data set, the problem of multicollinearity is found to be indeed significant 5 . Subgroup regression analysis is therefore needed to detect the delicate moderating effect of internal climate for innovation.
We divide our sample by mean values of the two factors of internal climate for innovation. If the value of the focal variable is larger than mean value, the firm is identified as having a promotive internal climate for innovation (either organizationally or individually), otherwise it will be identified as having a restrictive internal climate for innovation.
Results
Mean, standard deviation and zero-order correlations are presented in Table 7 . Insert Table 7 about here
The pooled sample regression analysis results (Table 8) This result strongly suggests that innovation collaboration cannot be treated uni-dimensionally, and that different stages of innovation process should be accounted for 6 . The result is consistent with the general observation in the literature that public R&D support programs tend to be particularly targeted at promoting innovation collaboration between firms and public research institutes/universities, and among firms at the pre-competitive stage.
Insert Table 8 about here
To examine how the overall relationship between public R&D support and firm innovation behavior may be moderated by the firms' internal climate for innovation, Table 9 below presents our subgroup regression results when the overall sample is divided into firms with promotive and restrictive organizational policies (hypothesis IIa) and individual attitudes (hypothesis IIb)
respectively.
Insert Table 9 about here Both hypothesis IIa and IIb appear to be largely supported by our subgroup regression results. In the case of hypothesis IIa, for five of the eight dependent variables, a significantly positive relationship with the presence of public R&D support is found for the sub-sample of firms with promotive organizational policies for innovation; in contrast, for the sub-sample of firms with restrictive organizational policies, no significant relationship is found for the eight dependent variables.
Similarly, for hypothesis IIb where the individual attitudes factor is used as the moderating variable, six out of the eight dependent variables show significant positive relationship with public R&D support for the "promotive" sub-sample of firms, while only one of the eight dependent variables, R&D intensity, exhibits a significant relationship with public R&D support for the "restrictive" subsample. However, the moderating effect of individual attitudes still persists for R&D intensity, because the impact of public R&D support is larger and more significant in promotive sub-sample (.01 level) than in restrictive sub-sample (.05 level). It is also found that the coefficients of public R&D support are generally much larger in the promotive sub-sample than in the restrictive subsample.
To test the robustness of our results, mid-point estimate measures of innovation input and output are replaced with the original ordinal class data. The results are largely the same, except the coefficient for R&D intensity becomes significant at 0.5 level for restrictive organizational policies sub-sample, compared to the .01 significance level for promotive organizational policies sub-sample. One may argue that firms are forced to cooperate with R&D institutes/university in the public R&D support program, so we also reduce this measurement to two items excluding the other two related to R&D institutes/universities. Then, we find the impact of public R&D support on innovation collaboration intensity with knowledge sources (reduced measurement, α=0.755) is significant (p<.05) in promotive individual attitudes group, but not significant in other groups and pooled sample. Besides mean value grouping, quartile grouping (upper quartile and lower quartile) is also examined and the results are not materially changed. But the small sample size in quartile grouping may reduce the reliability of the result.
The above results suggest two interesting findings. Firstly, it suggests that the impact of public R&D support on certain aspects of firm innovation behavior may become obscured if the moderating effect of firm's internal climate for innovation is not taken into account. Recall that, from Table 8, for collaboration with industrial players, collaboration at near-market stages, and process innovation measures, positive relationships with public R&D support are not significant when the sample is pooled. However, when the moderating effect of organizational policies is taken into account, the relationships become significant for collaboration at near market stages and process innovation.
Similarly, when the moderating effect of individual attitudes is incorporated, the relationships become significant for collaboration with industrial players and collaboration at near-market stages.
The second interesting finding is that different dimensions of internal climate for innovation may have different moderating effect on the impact of public R&D support. For example, with respect to collaboration with industrial players, the individual attitudes factor plays a significant moderating role, but the organizational policies factor does not. Conversely, the organizational policies factor has a significant moderating effect on process innovation, but the individual attitudes factor does not.
On the whole, the individual attitudes factor seems to have a stronger moderating effect than does the organizational policies factor. Comparing the three groups of dependent variables, innovation input, innovation output, and innovation collaboration, internal climate has a rather weaker moderating effect on innovation output.
Overall, the combined results of Table 8 and 9 suggest that public R&D support appears to have stronger impact on the innovation behavior of firms that have a promotive internal climate for innovation, i.e., firms that have promotive internal climate for innovation appear to be more predisposed to respond to public R&D support. We believe that this causality interpretation is plausible, for the possibility that there may have been a selection bias, i.e. that the government may have deliberately chosen firms with a promotive internal climate to support, can be ruled out based on our data, because correlation analysis has shown that there is no statistically significant relationship between the moderating variables and the independent variable, and the moderating variables also exhibit no main effect on the dependent variables.
Limitations and implications of results
There are a number of limitations associated with our dataset and analysis methodology. Firstly, the limitation of small sample size and the existence of multicollinearity problem preclude us from the use of simultaneous equation systems incorporating multiple dependent variables and instrumental variables to control for possible endogeneity of public R&D support and interactions among the dependent variables. Secondly, our dataset is not detailed enough to investigate how internal firm factors may moderate the impact of different types of public R&D support programs. Several different types of public support for private sector innovation have been studied in the literature, such as fiscal incentives, R&D grants, government procurement, and low interest rate loans. Public support programs may also have very different objectives and processes. Lastly, firms' experience in R&D and innovation collaboration prior to their participation in public R&D support programs has not been controlled for due to lack of data. It is plausible that the marginal effect of public R&D support might be different between firms with prior government project experience and firms without this kind of experience.
The above limitations notwithstanding, our findings based on the Singapore data do shed some new lights on the on-going policy debate on the role of public R&D support programs. Firstly, for some time now, policy makers have voiced increasing interest in assessing the impact of public S&T policy on a broader array of measurable firm behavioral variables, rather than the traditional focus on input and output measurement that effectively treats the firm as a black box. We believe that our results provide new empirical support for the existence of behavioral impact of public R&D support programs. By showing that the impact of public R&D support programs can be meaningfully detected using specific behavioral indicators, we believe that our results should encourage policy makers to devise more comprehensive monitoring tools to capture the broader behavioral impact of public policy.
Secondly, from a policy perspective, our results on the contingent impacts of public R&D support programs suggest that it is important to look "inside the block box" in designing and implementing public S&T policy. Rather than applying uniform policies or spreading scarce R&D support resources to all firms indiscriminately, public policy makers may need to consider a selective approach that targets certain groups of firms that are likely to be more responsive, or where the impacts are likely to be greatest, without distorting the market mechanisms. In particular, our results suggest that the internal climate for innovation construct may be a useful selection criterion for public policy design. A fruitful direction for future policy research is therefore to further refine the measures we have used to better discriminate the internal climate for innovation of firms.
While our results have demonstrated the importance of firm's internal climate for innovation, more research is needed to better understand how it actually operates to influence the impact of public R&D support. One possibility is that firms with a more promotive internal climate may have a more optimistic perception of the external environment for innovation, and hence are more pre-disposed to act on the opportunities created or facilitated by public R&D support programs. Evidence in this direction can be derived from additional information covered in our survey dataset on how the respondent firms perceive the external environment for innovation. Using a 5-point Likert scale (1=poor to 5=good), the respondent firms were asked to evaluate the 14 dimensions of the environment of Singapore for innovation. Usual T-test reveals that the firms' perception of external innovation environment differ significantly depending on whether the firms have a promotive or restrictive internal climate for innovation (see Table 10 ). Firms with a promotive internal climate for innovation rate all the items of external environment for innovation in Singapore higher than do firms with a restrictive internal climate for innovation. Of the 14 items, two have significant t-test scores for both dimensions of internal climate for innovation, and eight have significant mean differences along either one of the two factors. Only four items do not show statistically significant mean difference in the perception scores. It is interesting to note that one of these four items with no significant difference pertains to the perception of the availability of government incentives for innovation, i.e. the two groups of firms differ not because they have different perceptions of the accessibility of public R&D support (hence discrimination is not an issue), but rather because they have different perceptions of most of the other dimensions of the external environment for innovation. A possible policy implication here is that public policies and programs to make the external environment more conducive for innovation are unlikely to be effective if most of the firms still have a restrictive internal climate for innovation.
Insert Table 10 about here Thirdly, our results suggest that both individual attitudes as well as organizational policies are important moderating factors on how well firms respond to public R&D policy stimuli. While organizational policies is largely a function of the specific management in place within given organizations, the individual attitudes of management and employees toward innovation are likely to be shaped not only by factors specific to the organizational environment, but also broader, sociocultural influences prevailing in the country or society as a whole. Besides encouraging organizational and management improvements of firms, our results suggest that public policy makers should also look into the need to change the values, mindsets and attitudes of its population towards innovation in general. It is interesting to note in this regard that the government of Singapore has recently recognized the need to play a proactive role to nurture an entrepreneurial culture and innovation-oriented climate among its population. This is part of a major shift in S&T policy design where the Singapore government has increasing emphasis on fostering high tech entrepreneurship and indigenous innovation as a counter-balance to past emphasis on attracting foreign investment to effect technology transfer (Wong, 1999) . The recent announcement of the Technopreneurship Initiative (T21 for short) with a public US$1 billion technopreneurship fund by the government of Singapore will certainly accelerate this emerging trend.
Fourthly, while our study pertains only to Singapore, we believe that the findings should be generalizable to other countries as well. In this regard, it would be interesting to replicate the research for other countries to see if similar findings hold. Similarly, although our study has documented the impact of public R&D support on only a small set of innovation behavior, we believe that the methodology can be extended in future research to examine the impact of public R&D support programs on a broader array of firm behavior as suggested by Buisseret et. al.(1995) .
Last, but not least, our findings should also of interest to managers and management research. In many industries, business has a big stake in public S&T policy (Nelson, 1995) . The environment within which firms operate includes a variety of institutions, ranging from regulatory authority to universities to government department, whose policies can make a big difference to the competitive advantage of the firms. As stated earlier, public R&D support is not just funding. It is also an opportunity for organizational learning and a platform for expanding innovation network. Our study strongly suggests that how much a firm can gain from public support programs also depend on the firm itself.
Conclusion
This study adopts a broader behavioral additionality framework for evaluating public R&D support programs in contrast to the traditional input additionality and out additionality approaches. Using data from a sample of manufacturing firms in Singapore, we find that public R&D support has an impact on certain dimensions of innovation behavior of firms. Using subgroup regression analysis, we further identify a firm's internal climate for innovation as a moderator on the relationship between public R&D support and firm innovation behavior. Moreover, we find that the effect of public R&D support on certain aspects of the innovation behavior of firms may be obscured if the moderating influence of firm's internal climate for innovation is not taken into account. We suggest the need for policy makers to incorporate understanding of firm's internal characteristics in designing innovation support programs and policies. 
